This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

600044026M

2274 d. 10

A

LETTER

TO

EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING.]

2274 d. 10

Bt. from Mr. Chapman

A

LETTER

TO

EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

Occaſioned by his

SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT

February 11, 1780.

——— *tibi cura magni*
Cæſaris fatis data : tu, ſecundo
Cæſare, regnes.

HOR.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. BEW, IN PATER-NOSTER ROW.
MDCC LXXX.

A

LETTER

TO

EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

SIR,

TO correct the diſorders of a great and ancient ſtate; diſorders which have *grown with its growth, and ſtrengthened with its ſtrength*, is ſo nice and ſo difficult an undertaking, that we ought not to wonder if thoſe who try it ſhould fail in the attempt. But the undertaking is of ſo noble and ſo beneficent a kind, that even the attempt, when ſincere and diſintereſted, merits ſome ſhare of our approbation. There are, indeed, many people who will not grant this ſpecies of merit to you and your aſſociates,

in your preſent ſcheme of reforming the government of Great Britain: alledging that your motives are ſordid or ſpiteful, and your purpoſes miſchievous. Upon what they found this allegation I do not know, for I cannot allow that a miſchievous conduct is a ſufficient proof of a miſchievous intention. But let them found it upon what they will, no ſuch conjecture will appear in any part of this letter. On the contrary, it will every where preſume, that your purpoſe is to promote the public welfare, and will only enquire how far the wiſdom of the means has been adequate to the benignity of the end.

Thoſe who do not look deeper than the ſurface of things, may perhaps conſider this letter as a criticiſm upon your conduct; but without a more extended view, I ſhould not have written a ſingle line of it. It is indeed addreſſed to you; but not as a private gentleman, or as a member for the city of Briſtol: it is addreſſed to you as the mouth of a formidable party,

as the representative of all the county meetings, committees, and other reforming associations now swarming in every part of the kingdom: and, as it is things, not persons, which are the objects of my enquiry, I shall make no scruple in blending your conduct and theirs into one mass, or in mixing my observations upon what is contained in their petitions with what I find in your speech, without being at the pains of nicely distinguishing them.

I shall, then, set out with this general observation; that in all your proceedings, though intimately connected with the supreme political affairs of this country, there is nothing that announces that *spirit of business* which distinguishes great statesmen from great men of every other profession. Not to indulge myself in the use of ambiguous phrases, I mean by the *spirit of business*, that species of mind which is constantly occupied in the consideration of cause and effect; which looks back with ease to the *pourquoi* of the *pourquoi*, and

forward

forward to the conſequence of conſequences; and which forbids the engaging in any enterprize till all the ſteps are foreſeen, and all the means are provided for rendering it effectual.

To enter at once upon the ſubject: Your firſt general poſitions are, that an *undue* expenditure of the public money ought to be prevented; that *exorbitant* ſalaries ought to be diminiſhed; that *unmerited* penſions ought to be reſcinded; and, that *abuſes* in government ought to be reformed; poſitions ſo ridiculouſly true, that nothing can account for their coming from the mouth of any man of the leaſt diſcernment, except their being meant as baits for drawing ſhallow people to put their names to petitions containing a variety of other matters of a much more dark and ambiguous kind.

To make us however amends for this too great ſimplicity, the next ſet of poſitions, and which make the moſt ſhining figure in all your ſpeeches and petitions, are ſo far

far from being truiſms, that they are not true at all; I mean the aſſertions that this extravagant diſtribution of the public money in ſalaries and penſions is inſtrumental to the influence of the Crown; that the increaſe of it tends to increaſe this influence; and that this influence is dangerous to the liberty of the people.

Men who reaſon without facts, or, what is worſe, from facts ill underſtood and improperly ſtated, muſt never expect a rational or uſeful concluſion. Let us, then, examine ſtrictly what is the true ſtate of the facts, relatively to this matter. Influence in government can only originate from power or riches; words in the political dictionary meaning almoſt the ſame thing. Whatever original power or riches the Kings of England might have formerly poſſeſſed, I leave to the diſcuſſion of hiſtorians and antiquaries; it is to us a matter of mere curioſity, and totally unconnected with the preſent queſtion. Notwithſtanding the high ſounding words of King, Lords, and Commons, in parlia-

ment aſſembled, it is a fact of great notoriety, and of which no man of reflection can be ignorant, that the diſpoſal of the riches, and with it the ſupreme uncontroulable power of this country, has been for many years exerciſed by the majority of the Houſe of Commons alone; and that any attempt in the other two parts of the legiſlature to interfere in this important money buſineſs, has been held to be unconſtitutional.

This is a ſyſtem which has been gradually forming upon what are now called Revolution Principles. It has been ſtiled by its friends *The Whig Syſtem*; and by its enemies, *The Syſtem of Corruption*; but I, who neither mean to praiſe or to blame, and only mean, without fee or reward, to ſhew, what it really is, do ſay, that it is the popular or democratic ſyſtem, and the moſt popular and democratic that was ever ſeen in any empire ſo rich and extended as ours. It is a ſyſtem originating from the people, and which has been carried to the utmoſt limits of popularity

that

mons have the exclusive privilege of *giving and granting* the nation's money for every purpose, civil and military, all the consequences I have hinted are obvious. The King, I have said, may declare war; but if the majority of the House of Commons are not willing to vote the requisite supplies, his declaration must be immediately recalled; to prevent which he will be sure not to declare any war till this majority have made it their own, by testifying their approbation of it. He, it is said, has the command of the army and navy; but if the House of Commons do not chuse to vote the annual money for their pay, he would have no army or navy to command: and in case they should postpone the passing the annual act of parliament against mutiny and desertion till after the 25th of *March*, the army on foot, down to the sentinel at his palace-gate, would be legally disbanded.

With regard to the disposal of offices, civil and military, it is needless to enter into a tedious detail. It is easy for a man

of

of your good memory and readineſs of ſpeech to make a commentary upon the little red book to laſt three hours and a half; but when done, we ſhall learn little more from it than from the ſhort anecdote you relate from Lord TALBOT, who, you ſay, gave up all his attempts to reform the King's kitchen, upon finding that the Turnſpit was a Member of parliament. This is enough for our inſtruction, *et hoc nobis non altius inſeret Ammon.* Why fatigue ourſelves with hacking at the wide-ſpreading and ever-renewing branches of a noxious tree, when the ſingle root lies ſo viſible, and ſo expoſed to the axe?

But, Sir, I will go further, and will aſſert, that *a real man of buſineſs* did not ſtand in need of this information from Lord TALBOT in order to be let into the ſecret. A general knowledge of mankind, and a general knowledge of the real conſtitution of this country, ought to have been ſufficient for the purpoſe. All men, in all countries, and in all times, who have been poſſeſſed of ſupreme power,

have conſtantly availed themſelves of that advantage for enriching themſelves and their connections. The majority of the Houſe of Commons, our preſent ſupreme power, is compoſed of men; and it would be an exceſs of folly to ſuppoſe them actuated by motives different from the reſt of mankind. In fact, there is not a ſingle place of thoſe ſaid to be in the *gift* of the Crown, that is not poſſeſſed by a Member of parliament, or by ſome-body who holds it at his requiſition. Theſe requiſitions are made, ſometimes in polite terms, ſometimes roughly; but, in whatever form they are urged, they muſt be complied with, *elſe*—Do you aſk me what is further meant by the word *elſe?* The anſwer is exceedingly obvious; the perſon commonly called the Chief Miniſter, but who is, in reality, no more than the agent for tranſacting what belongs to this political loan between the Crown and the People, would ſoon, in caſe of repeated refuſals, have a majority of the Houſe of Commons againſt him,

who,

who, by an addreſs to his majeſty, would immediately get him removed from his office; as they would, in like manner, his ſucceſſor, if he ſhewed himſelf equally ignorant in diſtinguiſhing who were his real maſters. I am almoſt aſhamed to have written ſo much in explanation of a matter of ſo ſimple a kind as to require but a hint to be perfectly underſtood. I will, therefore, conclude this part of my ſubject by obſerving, that when you, by your new Act of parliament, ſhall have ſtripped the King of the ſmall remains of his private fortune, the private fortune of his anceſtors from William the Conqueror, that he will be the only man in the Britiſh dominions who has neither liberty nor property to boaſt of; and that he will be intirely at the mercy of the majority of the Houſe of Commons for the ſhoes he wears, and for the bread he daily diſtributes to his numerous and beautiful family. To this you will perhaps ſay, that he has no need of private property, for that *the pariſh is bound to*

find

find him. Be it ſo: I know it has been long a favourite notion of a certain ſet of people; and I do not deſire them to adopt any notion of mine in the room of it. All I deſire of them, and of you, is, a little meaning and conſiſtency; and that you would deſiſt from inflaming the minds of the populace by declamations about the *dangerous influence* of a perſon whom the popular ſyſtem has already reduced to the moſt helpleſs ſtate of dependence.

Once more let me repeat, that I neither mean to praiſe or to blame our preſent ſyſtem of government: I mean to act a part ſomewhat ſimilar to that of a poſt upon the highway, which points out the ſeveral roads to the doubtful traveller, while it has, itſelf, no intention of ſtirring a foot.

In the exerciſe, then, of this poſt-like function, allow me to point out to you, that the preſent influence, either as it is repreſented by you, or by me, can, in

neither caſe, be dangerous to the liberty of the people. It is, indeed, a ſyſtem that by over-checking the public exertions, may, ſome time or other, endanger the independency of the whole Britiſh State, relatively to foreigners, and with it all our lives, liberties, and properties; but the internal liberty of the people, relatively to their own rulers, can never be affected by any increaſe of it; except that increaſe ſhould go ſo far as to produce anarchy, or a total diſſolution of that very corrupt ſyſtem that you complain of: In the mean while the people themſelves are the *primum mobile* of this ſyſtem, the primary diſpoſers of their own liberty, or political power.

——*ſectorique favoris*
Ipſe ſui populus——

and whether this favour of the people is to be acquired by love or by money, is nothing to the preſent queſtion. They will always be their own maſters while they continue to have the diſpoſal of themſelves; and will be the more tena-

cious

cious in retaining and extending their liberty, the higher price they find it will bring. This increasing influence, for I am sensible that it does increase, is owing to the increasing avidity of Members of parliament, partly occasioned by the increasing number and avidity of their constituents: and it will probably continue increasing till such time as all the money that can be raised from the *whole* of the inhabitants of Great Britain, assisted by all the money his Majesty may draw from his more distant dominions, will be unable to satisfy them. Beyond this period I do not chuse to cast my eye; but, as a friend to liberty, hope it is still at a great distance.

That there may be errors and extravagancies in the expenditure of the public money, is what I do not attempt to controvert; and heartily wish, with you, that they could be altogether prevented. The question still to be answered, is, how? Many attempts have been made of this sort, but being rather the product of fac-

tion and clamour than of any ſolid principle, have been found to do more harm than good. Place-acts, after place-acts, have been paſſed, to prevent perſons holding offices from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons; by which that Houſe has been deprived of many men whoſe general knowledge of buſineſs would have been a help, and whoſe celebrity of character would have been an ornament to it, while their ſeats in the houſe have been filled by remitters, contractors, and others of the ſame obſcure and illiberal claſs, and whoſe emoluments are much more difficult to be limited or aſcertained. Theſe, Sir, are things not to be raſhly and inconſiderately tampered with. If the evils we complain of are without remedy, the complaint is weak and unmanly; if there is a viſible remedy, but which, upon application, would produce a worſe diſtemper, it would be madneſs to apply it. In no part of your Speech do I find this important point of the remedy taken into conſideration; and this is what I call a

want

want of that *spirit of business*, which, in my opinion, is not to be compensated by the most lively metaphors, or the most harmonious periods. The first step to be taken towards the cure of any distemper is to find out the true cause. The cause being removed, the distemper will probably cease of itself. If the cause is of such a nature as not to be susceptible of removal, the case is desperate. You have assigned as the cause of our exorbitant expences the overbearing and growing influence of the Crown, and in consequence of this notion have advised parliament to strip the King of the small remains of his patrimonial revenue, in order to render him, if possible, more dependent upon the House of Commons. But unless all I have said of the power of the House of Commons, is a chain of falsehoods, the cause you assign is the reverse of the true one; and consequently every new step taken to increase the power of the Commons and the dependence of the Crown, must operate in increasing the evil.

But

But theſe are not the only things in which the *ſpirit of buſineſs* is wanting. Whether the public money goes into the pockets of the majority in parliament by the voluntary contrivance of the King, or by their own ſovereign will and pleaſure, ſtill it is allowed to go into their pockets. What hope, then, is there of any redreſs from petitions or ſpeeches that are addreſſed to the perſons acknowledged to be in fault? To conſtitute thoſe who are parties to be likewiſe the judges in the cauſe, ſhews very little of the *ſpirit of buſineſs*, and very little knowledge of the means by which all buſineſs is rendered effectual. Perhaps you may ſay, you mean no more than to *adviſe* what you conceive to be for the public good; leaving to parliament, in its ſuperior wiſdom, to adopt as much or as little of your advice as it ſhall ſee convenient. If this is all the part you mean to act, you do no more than what becomes you as a vigilant ſenator, whoſe zeal, in every event, merits the thanks of the public. But in this caſe, I would adviſe you, by

way of conſiſtency, to blot out from your Speech certain expreſſions, very ſignificantly printed in Italics, and likewiſe, to enter your ſolemn proteſt againſt certain Reſolves of county meetings and committees; all of which ſtrongly indicate ſome other mode of adviſing, ſome other form of prayer, of a more coercive and effectual kind.

I ſee in every part of your Speech much diligence, much information, and much arrangement; and it is, in this reſpect, both entertaining and inſtructive; but I perceive, at the ſame time, that it is the arrangement of a merchant or manufacturer, whoſe thoughts go no farther than to increaſe the neat profits of his trade, by leſſening the expences of it. In ſuch a man it would be certainly wiſe to get the uſual work of two labourers to be performed by one, or the work of twenty to be performed by a machine; and from thence you conclude, that it would be equally wiſe in the Britiſh nation to get all the buſineſs of the ſeveral State depart-

ments

ments executed by five or ſix men, at the annual expence of a few hundred pounds. But, Sir, you are far behind in the art of ſmile-making, if you imagine there is any analogy between the ſupreme management of an independent State, and the managment of a brewhouſe. And yet ſo you ſeem inclined; for in all this long Speech, in which you even profeſs, along with ſaving money, an intention to correct many political abuſes, there does not appear one political idea to direct or limit your œconomy; ſo that, for any thing you know, or conſider, you may be doing the public a pound of damage, while you are ſaving it an ounce of money. Now, Sir, if I had leiſure and inclination to write a Letter as long as your Speech, it would be eaſy for me to ſhew that the conſideration of the public œconomy of every nation is inſeparably connected with that of its particular form of government: That in all States, where the uſe of money is known, one univerſal practice prevails; which is that of raiſing

a certain

a certain ſum from the whole inhabitants, to be afterwards diſtributed to a few of them: That this diſtribution is not alone intended as the *means* of procuring certain ſervices to be performed for the community, but is itſelf one of the ultimate ends for which the money is raiſed; That according to the different forms of government, the public money is differently diſtributed; and that the numbers and quality of the receivers is that which chiefly marks the different Conſtitutions of different ſtates, whether deſpotic, ariſtocratic, or popular; whether military or eccleſiaſtic. In the courſe of this diſſertation, it would be eaſy for me to ſhew that one form of government is naturally leſs expenſive than another; and I ſhould probably finiſh it by ſhewing, that the cheapeſt is not always the moſt eligible. At preſent I ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that no ſuch leading political principle is to be found, either expreſſed or implied, in your Speech; but on the contrary, if we may be allowed to

judge by implication, there is ground to believe that you had no fixed political principle at all in your mind at the time you compoſed it. My ground for this bold aſſertion is, that I find in different parts of that Speech a recommendation of practices implying principles and views perfectly incompatible with one another. For in ſome parts it ſeems to be your driſt to extend the popularity of our government; in other parts you praiſe a conduct borrowed from deſpotiſm, and which can only be expected from ſuch a State. For inſtance, you recommend the frugal management of the King of Pruſſia's houſhold, as a matter of imitation for the King of Great-Britain. We all know that the King of Pruſſia's cook is *under contract* to furniſh dinner to his majeſty for twenty ſhillings a day, and to receive five ſhillings a-head for ſuch gueſts as may be occaſionally invited beyond that number. Now, Sir, I will venture to aſſert, upon the credit of thoſe who have often ſtood behind our Sovereign, when at his meals, that he is neither a

glutton

glutton nor an epicure; and that he may be fed as cheaply as the Kind of Pruſſia, whenever you and your friends will put him in a ſimilar ſituation. But this frugality is impracticable while a Member of parliament inſiſts upon having the honour of turning his ſpit; and who would immediately go over to the Minority, in caſe his Majeſty ſhould at any time find fault with his pocketing as much kitchen-fee in one day as would maintain the King of Pruſſia and his French *beaux eſprits* for a month.

You exhibit, with great oſtentation, the late Edict of the King of France, recalling many lucrative offices that had been granted to perſons and families of great diſtinction; expreſſing at the ſame time his intention of employing that money in the defence of the State, or of occaſionally diſtributing it to perſons whom he ſhould think moſt deſerving. But you ought to conſider, before you make ſuch invidious compariſons, that a French King's edicts are equal in authority

with our Acts of parliament; and that none of theſe great people who are thus deprived of their appointments have any votes, by which they may thwart and perplex his future meaſures.

You commend the King of France for his judgment, and his regard for his people, in appointing one who is a Swiſs and a Proteſtant to direct his finances. What are we to draw from hence? Would you think our King acted with judgment if he ſent for a foreign Papiſt, let his knowledge of finances be what it would, and ſet him at the head of his treaſury?

If you could only tell us what you would be at, an obſcure friend like me might be perhaps able to help you in reducing it to effect, or in convincing you that it was impracticable. But, if after all this ambiguity, you are really willing to ſave the nation's money by giving our monarch, like the Kings of France and Pruſſia, an unlimitted power of withholding ſalaries from thoſe who do

nothing

nothing uſeful for them; although I moſt heartily abominate the project, yet to explain to you what I mean by the *ſpirit of buſineſs*, I will point out a method by which it may be eaſily accompliſhed. Nor, perhaps will the communication be altogether uſeleſs to the public. The knowledge of poiſons is a neceſſary branch of the medicinal art, were it only for this, that they are carefully to be avoided, which would not happen, if thoſe who have the adminiſtration of medicines were not taught accurately to diſtinguiſh thoſe poiſons from the ſalutary drugs.

With this uſeful view, and in perfect confidence that the good people of England will not be ſo mad, as wittingly and willingly to ſwallow arſenic, inſtead of ſugar, after I have ſhewn them the difference, I will ſhew you how a King of England may be ſet as free from the neceſſity of corrupting or being corrupted, as any King on the Continent. Nor do I mean to arrogate any praiſe to myſelf for the diſcovery;

diſcovery; for I confeſs that I received the firſt hint of it from a public letter of the Duke of RICHMOND; though his grace, who is more a man of buſtle than a man of buſineſs, did not probably ſee the whole merit of his innovation, nor to what a degree it might be improved.

Let there then be invitations printed in the newſpapers for convening meetings in each county, addreſſed;

To the copyholders, curates, and all the other inhabitants of the county of who have never been permitted to vote for Members of parliament: and when met, let ſome perſon, previouſly trained at the ſocieties for public ſpeaking, addreſs them in a ſtrain ſomewhat like the following:

"Friends and Countrymen,

"You muſt have all obſerved that in "the advertiſement for the purpoſe of "convening this meeting, the freehold-"ers of the county have been ſtudiouſly "excluded; but it is now proper to in-"form you that this excluſion is not in-"tended to be perpetual. God forbid

"that

" that in a plan which is meant to eſtabliſh
" the equal liberty of every Engliſhman,
" the freeholders alone ſhould be depriv-
" ed of their birthright. But as this plan
" ſtrikes directly at what we apprehend
" to be an uſurpation of theirs, it might
" have been productive of much diſorder,
" if we had admitted them into our
" deliberations, till the plan came to be ſo
" ſettled, that their oppoſition to it would
" be manifeſtly ineffectual, and conſe-
" quently not attempted. Indeed, if we
" were to interpret the name *Freeholders*,
" according to the conduct of thoſe who
" have borne it, we muſt conclude that
" they were ſo called from their *holding*
" themſelves alone to be *free*, while they
" *held* all the other inhabitants of the
" county to be ſlaves, and creatures of
" whoſe perſons and property they had
" the intire diſpoſal. It is, indeed, an
" uſurpation of long ſtanding, and if it
" had been uſed with moderation, and
" for the general good of the community,
" it might have laſted ſtill longer,

" without our being prompted to ſearch
" into its original foundation. But
" lulled by our long patience into a ſtate
" of ſecurity, they have, by little and
" little, turned this uſurped power into a
" diſgraceful and pernicious traffic, which
" has at laſt opened our eyes, and obliges
" us to aboliſh it, as oppreſſive to the
" majority of the individuals, and dan-
" gerous to the State itſelf. Our govern-
" ment has been ſaid to be a government
" of King, Lords, and Commons; but it
" has been ſaid unthinkingly and with-
" out examination. It will be found,
" that of late years, neither the King,
" the Lords, nor nine out of ten of the
" Commons, have had any eſſential ſhare
" in it; but that the whole has been
" exerciſed by a few in the counties,
" who call themſelves *Freeholders*, and
" a few in certain towns, who call
" themſelves *Freemen*, under which names,
" which add inſult to injury, they have
" *given* and *granted* the property of
" the rich and the poor, of the Peer

" and

" and the Peaſant without their advice or " conſent. And to whom did they give " and grant our money? It was ſaid " to the King; to be expended in the " public ſervice, and in the defence of " the kingdom. If this had been true, " there would have been no ſolid ground " for complaint; but it is all a juggle. " The King, upon a nearer inſpection, is " now found out to be only their ſteward " or banker, and that they have employed " the plenitude of their power, or influence, " in demanding back from him by their " agents or repreſentatives in parliament " a great part of this public money for " their own private uſe; and a much " greater part than the public ſervice, " eſpecially in time of war, could with " ſafety permit.

" I do not like to enter into a diſguſt- " ful detail of what has been juſtly " called a *Syſtem of Corruption*. Thoſe " who have any curioſity of this ſort " will find ſufficient gratification to it

" from reading the ſpeeches of the " Minority in parliament, as printed in " every newſpaper; and from Mr. " BURKE's excellent Speech, which for " your benefit he has given to the preſs. " It is ſufficient for me to have hinted to " you the general principle of this ſyſtem, " and the ſource from whence it pro- " ceeds. The time is now come for " putting an end to it. It is now time " that our gracious Sovereign, our an- " cient Nobility, and *every free-born* " Engliſhman, ſhould be freed from an " unworthy thraldom to a ſet of contrac- " tors, jobbers, and Eaſt India clerks; " and that, inſtead of the dominion of " money, the dominion of men ſhould " be once more reſtored. If you are " hearty in this deſign, nothing can " prevent the accompliſhment of it. To " bribe you will not be attempted; and " you are too numerous to be forced. " Nor is there any quarter from whence " force is to be apprehended. The King

" muſt

" must be pleased with our dutiful attach-
" ment, and the confidence we place in
" him: the Nobility seem to participate
" of our sufferings; and even many of the
" Freeholders shew themselves to be dis-
" satisfied with the consequences of the
" system, as appears by the petitions and
" resolves of the late county meetings,
" though, by the bias'd Freeholders having
" been the majority at these meetings,
" there has been no attempt made at them
" for probing the sore to the bottom, and
" producing an effectual cure.

" I therefore move, *That an humble*
" *address and petition be drawn up and*
" *presented to his Majesty, praying him to*
" *take under his royal and paternal care the*
" *expenditure of the public money: That he*
" *will be graciously pleased to abolish all*
" *sinecures and useless places; to retrench all*
" *exorbitant salaries; and to revoke or di-*
" *minish all pensions which are held by per-*
" *sons who have never done any thing to*
" *deserve them. And, moreover, to assure*

" *his Majeſty, that we, his faithful people,*
" *will ſupport him in the execution of this*
" *his public duty, with our lives and for-*
" *tunes, againſt every cabal of every denomi-*
" *nation whatſoever.*"

This, Sir, is a plauſible ſort of language, which has often been ſucceſsful in deſtroying public liberty, and perhaps never bade fairer for ſucceſs than in this country at this preſent time. I hope, however, that neither you, nor any of your aſſociates in reformation, will ſuffer your rage againſt bad miniſters to carry you ſuch lengths as to try the experiment. Every form of government, like every other contrivance of that frail and imperfect creature, man, is ſubject to abuſes, of one ſort or another; and it is a ſufficient encomium upon ours to ſay, that it is, in the opinion of the wiſeſt men in Europe, that form by which abuſes are beſt prevented. Whatever checks can be conſtitutionally given to faults in the adminiſtration of our government, it is our duty to give;

but let us be cautious in our amendments, how we touch that venerable Conſtitution itſelf, and let us conſtantly approach it with a fearful and trembling hand. *Octingentorum annorum fortuna diſciplinaque compages hæc coaluit: quæ convelli niſi cum exitio convellentium non poteſt. Sed vobis maximum diſcrimen, penes quos aurum & opes, præcipuæ bellorum cauſæ.* Theſe lines of Tacitus I beg you to read to your friend the Marquis of ROCKINGHAM; and to tell him from me, his unknown well-wiſher, that whatever advantage may accrue to the low, the profligate, and the needy, from the bonds of law and government being thrown looſe, that a Peer of England, with a fortune ſuitable to his high rank, has nothing to hope from it, nor from any of thoſe ſcenes of bloodſhed and rapine, with which ſuch diſſolutions are generally attended.

Theſe, Sir, unconnected with all party views, are my own genuine ſentiments upon

upon the buſineſs now in agitation; and I hope you will believe me equally ſincere, when I aſſure you, that

I am, with great perſonal regard,

Your friend and well-wiſher,

STEADY.

LONDON, *Mar.* 13, 1780.

FINIS.